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"We have a criminal jury system which is superior to any other in
the world; and its efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding
twelve every day men who don't know anything and can't read."'
Introduction
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that criminal defendants be tried by an impartial jury from the state
and district in which the crime was committed. 2 Defining and im-
paneling "impartial" juries have proven to be daunting tasks with
which the United States' judicial system has struggled since before
the founding of the nation.
The quest for an "impartial" jury is made all the more difficult in
trials involving issues, events, or people of public interest. In these
situations, the press-vigorously exercising its first amendment
rights-may saturate the public with news and opinions about every
facet of the case. Potential jurors may arrive at the courthouse on
the first day of the trial with extensive knowledge about the victim,
the crime, and the defendant, including inaccurate or influential in-
formation which may, for evidentiary or strategic purposes, never be
introduced in court. Judges are, for at least two reasons, virtually
powerless to stem this flow of information. First, the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that judges may not prohibit the
press from publishing truthful, lawfully obtained information relat-
ing to the trial.3 Judges may seek to limit the release of information
to the press, particularly by prosecutors, police, and court officers, 4
but the first amendment provides an *extraordinarily high obstacle to
restrictions on the press itself.5
The second impediment to judicial control over publication of in-
formation about a case is even more powerful than the protection
1. M. TWAIN, SKETCHES, NEW AND OLD 235 (Ist ed. 1875) (Author's Nat'l ed. 1968).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Id.
3. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (refusing to
restrain publication of juvenile offender's name, pursuant to state statute, where press had
obtained name at scene of offense and state had not demonstrated highest order interest);
Oklahoma Publishing Co., v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (disallowing pre-trial
restraining order for publication of name and picture of minor, where same had already ap-
peared and was public); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (refusing to
allow court to prohibit publication of information obtained at public hearing).
4. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (allowing restraint where press
had decided guilt prior to trial by slanting coverage and printing gossip, prosecutor and judge
were up for re-election, and trial turned into "bedlam at the courthouse" to which jurors were
constantly exposed).
5. The first amendment states, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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the first amendment affords the press. It is often impossible for a
judge to control the publication of prejudicial information because,
increasingly, the most dramatic revelations occur at the time of the
crime itself, long before there is a trial, much less ajudge selected to
oversee the trial. Photographs of the victim or of the defendant be-
ing led away in handcuffs by police, details about the crime, and the
outraged community's response are highly inflammatory, even
though they first appear well in advance of any trial.
As a result, in cases where control of the media is impossible or
simply not constitutionally permitted, the judicial system must focus
its attention on identifying, remedying, and avoiding, rather than
preventing, partiality among potential jurors. Courts employ a vari-
ety of techniques in their attempt to minimize the partiality prob-
lem.6 The technique most heavily relied upon is the voir dire
process, by which lawyers and judges question potential jurors to
determine bias.
Even though judges regularly rely on these techniques to help ful-
fill their constitutional duty to impanel impartial juries, many social
scientists question their effectiveness.7 In addition, critics charge
that the use of these methods impinges on important rights, such as
the sixth amendment right to be tried before a jury chosen from
"the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." 8
Moreover, as frequently employed, these measures, especially
voir dire, may focus the court's attention on the mere fact of expo-
sure to press reports, rather than on the existence and degree of any
bias or prejudice that may have been engendered by such exposure.
As a result, some courts mistake "unaware" for "impartial," and so
search unnecessarily for jurors who know nothing about the case to
be heard. This process, particularly in notorious cases, is often time
consuming and expensive. If the defendant is unusually well-
known, it may be impossible to impanel ajury wholly ignorant of his
or her activities. Such a quest may exclude qualified citizens from
the jury, resulting in panels composed of citizens who are less
knowledgeable about their surrounding community. At a minimum,
the search for "unaware"jurors diverts the court's attention from its
6. These techniques include: change of venue, continuance, and jury instructions. See
infra notes 92-151 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing these bias-minimizing
techniques).
7. See infra notes 92-151 and accompanying text (criticizing techniques used to remedy
juror bias).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (critiquing
change of venue); notes 102-04 and accompanying text (discussing effect of continuance).
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constitutional obligation to seat an "impartial" jury.9
Mark Twain noted this tendency to seat "unaware"jurors in place
of "impartial" jurors when he described the system by which jurors
are selected as putting "a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a
premium upon ignorance, stupidity, and perjury." 10 Twain wrote
that when juries were first used, in Twain's view by Alfred the Great,
news could not travel fast, and hence [Alfred] could easily find a
jury of honest, intelligent men who had not heard of the case they
were called to try-but in our day of telegraph and newspapers his
plan compels us to swear injuries composed of fools and rascals,
because the system rigidly excludes honest men and men of
brains.1 1
Twain's concern was that judges were responding to the expan-
sion of the media-in 1871, telegraph and newspapers-and news
reports about people and events which later were the subject of a
trial, by banning informed citizens from juries. Twain wrote about
the jury selection in one trial:
I remember one of those sorrowful farces, in Virginia, which we
call ajury trial. A noted desperado killed Mr. B., a good citizen, in
the most wanton and cold-blooded way. Of course the papers
were full of it, and all men capable of reading read about it. And
of course all men not deaf and dumb and idiotic talked about it
A minister, intelligent, esteemed, and greatly respected; a
merchant of high character and known probity; a mining superin-
tendent of intelligence and unblemished reputation; a quartz-mill
owner of excellent standing, were all questioned in the same way,
and all set aside. Each said public talk and the newspaper reports
had not so biased his mind but that sworn testimony would over-
throw his previously formed opinion and enable him to render a
verdict without prejudice and in accordance with the facts. But of
course such men could not be trusted with the case. Ignoramuses
alone could mete out unsullied justice. 12
More than a century later, The Daily Telegraph wrote about jury se-
lection in United States courts for another trial, that of Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North: "[I]gnorance is the path to enlightenment
.... The slightest taint of interest in the world beyond home and
9. See infra text accompanying notes 162-85 (arguing that focus of impartiality determi-
nation should not be how ignorant of case each juror is, but how well jury as whole is repre-
sentative of community).
10. M. TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 307 (Iowa Center for Textual Studies ed. 1972) (reprinting
Twain's 1871 work).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 307-08.
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work is enough to win dismissal." 13
The issues raised by Mark Twain and The Daily Telegraph demand
more attention than ever today. Satellites, mobile equipment,
broadcast and cable television, and other new technologies, com-
bined with an insatiable public curiosity, have led to an explosion in
news coverage and dramatic reenactments of criminal activities. In
1980, only twenty-one percent of American homes had cable televi-
sion; less than one percent had VCRs. 14 Today, more than fifty-
seven percent of television owners have cable television and seventy
percent have VCRs. 15 The average hours of television use by house-
hold has risen to approximately seven per day and average radio use
is almost three hours per day.16 In addition, more than sixty-four
percent of American households read newspapers. 17
Moreover, beginning with press coverage of civil rights demon-
strations in the early 1960s and then Vietnam War protests later in
the decade, the role of the press in politics and government has ex-
panded dramatically. New styles of investigative journalism and
more protective libel laws have led us to accept as commonplace the
role of the press in driving a president from office and more than
one presidential candidate from the campaign trail.18 This prolifer-
ation of the mass media in American life makes it impossible for any
responsible citizen to be unaware of alleged major crimes in the lo-
cal community. Even on the national level, Lieutenant Colonel Oli-
13. Brodie, Wanted- 12 Good Men and True, With Bad Memories, The Daily Telegraph
(London), Feb. 8, 1989, at 19, col..
14. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisicalAbstract of the United States: 1990 550 (1990) (list-
ing statistics concerning utilization of media in U.S. from 1970 to 1989); see also NIELSON
REPORT ON TELEVISION 1990 1, 3, 6, 11 (providing statistics concerning television viewing in
U.S.).
15. See VCR Use Rises; Pay Cable Falls, The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 2, 1990, at 8,
col. (commenting that 70%o of households in U.S. with televisions have VCRs); see also NIEL-
SON REPORT ON TELEVISION 1990 11 (stating that over two-thirds of TV households own
VCRs).
In addition to inundating the public with news about events which may later be the subject
of a trial, television programs may influence the public concerning the trial process. See Skipp,
Jurors' TV Viewing Is Growing Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1989, at B9, col. I (explaining that
"L.A. Law" may shape jurors' attitudes in real trials).
16. See Americans Tune in 7 Hours a Day, Nielsen Says, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at
P8, col. 3 (summarizing survey of 1987-88 television season in which Americans viewed aver-
age of 6 hours and 55 minutes of television, compared to 7 hours and 5 minutes prior season);
cf. Holston, Americans Dealing With the Fading Miracle of TVBy Dialing Out, Chicago Tribune, Oct.
13, 1990, at C17, col. 3 (finding through survey that Americans watch average of 4.1 hours
daily). See also C. Sterling, ELECTRONIC MEDIA 220 (1984) (providing statistics concerning
radio usage).
17. ANPA, FACTS ABOUT NEWSPAPERS (THE STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE NEWPAPER BuSI-
NESS) 5 (1990) (supplying data concerning newspaper readership in U.S.).
18. See generally M. FRANKLIN & D. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 2-3 (4th ed. 1990) (not-
ing changing role of press and tension between press and government officials in such in-
stances as Watergate and civil rights activities).
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ver North, District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry, Exxon Valdez
tanker captain Joseph Hazelwood, billionaire Leona Helmsley, or
Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega are household names.' 9
Justice Frankfurter wrote in a 1961 concurrence that "[n]ot a
Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convic-
tions, had in States throughout the country, in which substantial
claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because of in-
flammatory newspaper accounts."120 But the frequency of such
claims-driven by technological expansion, greater institutional
prerogative on the part of the media, and heightened public expec-
tations-has led to an explosion in claims by criminal defendants
and their counsel of juries biased by press reports.2 1 The public is
being inundated with courthouse steps claims by defense lawyers
that "my client can't get a fair trial because of pre-trial publicity."
In the decade just ended, the national newspapers and wire services
alone carried over 3,100 such claims. 22
19. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North was accused of several crimes arising out of arms-
for-hostages dealings with Iran, but was ultimately convicted on charges of "lying to Con-
gress, shredding White House documents and accepting a $14,000 security fence from an
Iran-contra arms dealer." White House Crime: Punish or Expose?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1990, at
A20, col. 1.
Mayor Marion Barry of the District of Columbia, although acquitted on one count, was
convicted on one misdemeanor count for possession of cocaine after the jury was unable to
reach a verdict on the remaining 12 counts. See Ayres, Jr., Barry Will Not Be Retried on 12
Unresolved Charges, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1990, at A18, col. 1.
Joseph Hazelwood, captain of the Exxon Valdez, was sentenced on one misdemeanor count
of negligence for the events leading to the huge Alaskan oil spill, but was acquitted of the
criminal charges. See Rempel, Hazelwood Tells of Images That Still Haunt Him, Los Angeles
Times, Mar. 25, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
Leona Helmsley was sentenced for federal income tax fraud for billing personal expenses to
her own hotel and real estate business, thus evading $1.2 million in taxes. Sullivan, Helmsley
Rejects Plea Agreement in State Tax Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1989, at B3, col. 1.
General Manuel Noriega will face trial for indictments in both Miami and Tampa stemming
from drug-trafficking allegations. See Lewis, Noriega's Surrender: The Prosecution; U.S. to Start
Noriega Case with Miami Indictment, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at A12, col. 1. On the Noriega
proceedings, one author remarked that General Noriega would be "assured a fair trial only if
the courts can summon 12 unbiased jurors with the mental alertness of moist towelettes."
Richmond, Loon over Miami: The On-Target Humor of Dave Barry, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990,
§ 6, at 44, col. 1 (quoting columnist Dave Barry).
20. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Irvin v. Dowd
involved a barrage of pre-trial publicity concerning a multiple killing in a small town. Id. at
720. The Court found that the community had already decided the guilt of the accused be-
cause of the pre-trial publicity. Id. at 725.
21. See, e.g.,Judge Rejects Lawyer's Plea In Jogger Trial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1990, at A27,
col. 6 (discussing attorney's request for new jury based on publicity surrounding previous
representation of Tawana Brawley, newsworthy figure in race controversy); Petti Opts for Judge,
Not Jury, to Hear Money-Laundering Case, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 6, 1990, at B3, col. 1 (describ-
ing defense attorney's strategy which focused on widespread publication of defendant's pho-
tograph); Salcido Weeps as Trial Begins: Disturbing Testimony On Slain Little Girls, San Francisco
Chronicle, Sept. 18, 1990, at A7, col. 1 (commenting that trial was moved because defense
complained of pre-trial publicity).
22. This figure is based on searches in the NEXIS newspaper and wire serivce databases
using the following search terms: (No or Not or Impossible or Unlikely or Prejudicl or Biasl)
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This Article examines the dilemma created when potential jurors
are exposed to media coverage of the events or people that later
become involved in high visibility criminal trials. Part I examines
the early common law background of criminal juries and describes
the standards that the United States Supreme Court has developed
for insuring the selection of impartial juries. Part II analyzes, in
light of current social science research, the techniques available to
state and federal trial courts for ferreting out unacceptably biased
members of the venire. Part III focuses on the roles juries and ju-
rors fill in the judicial system and in society generally, and considers
the meaning of an "impartial" jury in light of its historical context
and the reality of the current judicial system and mass communica-
tions market.
The Article concludes that courts must neither ignore the impact
of media coverage prior to the trial on the selection of an impartial
jury, nor become hopelessly enmeshed in examining the amount
and type of media coverage. The language of the sixth amendment,
the dictates of the Supreme Court, and the realities of modern soci-
ety require that courts impanel juries that are impartial, but are not
without knowledge and opinions. 23
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRIMINAL JURY AND EARLY EFFORTS TO
CONTROL THE IMPACT OF THE PRESS ON JURY SELECTION
A. The Early History of the Criminal Jury
In its earliest common law origins, the jury was composed of peo-
ple specifically chosen for their knowledge of the parties and facts
involved in the case.24 This was the case with the Assize of Claren-
don of 1166 which called for "the twelve most lawful men of the
hundred" and "the four most lawful men of every vill" to give testi-
w/ 25 (((Fair or Constitutionl) wI 4 trial or hearing) or ((Impartial or Bias! or Prejudicl) w/ 4
(Jury or Juror))) w/ 25 (Publicity or Report! or ((Media or Press) w/ 4 (Attention or Cover-
age))) and Date([as approporiate]). The figure may confidently be assumed to underestimate
the actual number of reports because not all national newspapers and services were covered
by these databases during the early 1980s. Moreover, it is reasonable to anticipate that far
more chiams would be reported by regional and local press-most of which are not included in
databases.
23. See infra notes 162-85 (arguing that impartial juror in today's society cannot be re-
quired to come into court as "blank slate"). The Supreme Court summarized this idea by
stating that it "is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and
issues involved .... It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-
24 (1961) (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)).
24. V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23-24 (1986) (stating that early jurors were
required to know either parties involved or facts of dispute in order to serve).
1991] 637
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:631
mony about accused felons in the region. 25 Records exist for a trial
as early as 900 A.D., in which the court summoned thirty-six peo-
ple-eighteen friends of each of the two parties-to settle a prop-
erty dispute.26
These people became known as compurgators because they fre-
quently took oaths as to the honesty and character of the parties.2 7
As a result, a requirement developed that the compurgators be
peers or equals of the parties.28 In the Magna Carta, King John
pledged "[n]o free man shall be taken or [dispossessed] or outlawed
or exiled or in any way destroyed.., except by lawful judgment of
his peers and the law of the land."'29
Early jury selection, like present-day voir dire, focused on the de-
gree to which potential jurors were knowledgeable about the facts of
the case. Unlike the situation today, however, knowledge of the
facts was a requirement for jury service, not an obstacle.30
With the growth of modem society and urban populations, the
judicial system evolved so that it no longer required actual knowl-
edge byjurors. The concept ofjurors as knowledgeable, active par-
ticipants in the judicial decision-making process, however,
continued. Therefore, a juror lacking actual knowledge was re-
quired to, at least, "speak from belief and conscience.131
When the American colonists adopted jury systems, they retained
this commitment to informed jurors. The colonists prized the right
to trial by jury as a bulwark against government oppression.3 2 They
25. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112-13 (5th ed. 1956)
(describing convocation of type of inquisition that was forerunner of modern day grand jury).
26. This is the famous case of Alfnoth, who claimed land in possession of a monastery.
W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 59-60 (2d ed. 1971). The monks, who also claimed
ownership, and Alfnoth appeared before a 36 person panel to resolve the dispute. Id. The
panel concluded that Alfnoth's claim was false and ordered him to forfeit his property to the
King because of his false claim. Id.
27. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 23-24 (describing function of compurga-
tors and comparing their role to that of character witness today).
28. 17 John (Magna Carta) (1215), quoted inJ. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES:
OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE JURY PANELS 3 (1977).
29. ME
30. L. MOORE, THE JURY 39 (1973). Professor Moore described the jury selection pro-
cess at the Grand Assize as follows:
Both parties had a right to be present at the election [of the jurors] and challenge for
good cause members of the proposed jury .... If it developed that the jurors testi-
fied under oath that they were unacquainted with the facts, other jurors were sum-
moned until there were 12 who had knowledge and who agreed. Knowledge did not
mean first-hand knowledge, but declarations of ajuror's father or other equally relia-
ble sources were sufficient.
Id.
31. Bracton, fol. 186, quoted in T. PLUNCKNETT, supra note 25, at 129 (1956) (recom-
mending that jurors ignorant of facts be placed with others who know truth).
32. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (A. Hamilton) (New Am. Library ed. 1961) (not-
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believed that local, lay juries would prevent arbitrary exercise of
government authority, that juries were "a valuable safeguard to lib-
erty" and "the palladium of free government. '38 This faith in the
virtues of trial by jury culminated in 1789 with the adoption of the
sixth amendment to the Constitution.3 4
Beginning in the early days of the republic, however, American
courts began to struggle with the issue of whether exposure to me-
dia coverage biases potential jurors. Perhaps the earliest and most
often quoted case to deal squarely with the issue was the 1807 trea-
son trial of Aaron Burr, over which ChiefJustice John Marshall pre-
sided.35 Media coverage of the feud between Burr and President
Jefferson had heightened interest in the sensational trial. Burr's at-
torneys argued that finding citizens for the jury who were unfamiliar
with the parties and the incident-a virtually impossible task-was
essential to protect the rights of their client.36 The Chief Justice
ruled on a motion which sought to disqualify citizens from the jury
who, though they had no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of
Burr, nonetheless were aware of the facts of the case.
Chief Justice Marshall explained that an impartial jury, as re-
quired by the Constitution and the common law, had to be com-
posed of those who would fairly hear the testimony offered, and
would base their verdict on that testimony and the applicable law.3 7
According to Chief Justice Marshall, any person with "strong
prejudices" had to be excluded from jury service because such a
person would favor testimony that confirmed his opinion.38 Yet, the
Chief Justice noted, requiring that jurors have no opinions "would
exclude intelligent and observing men, whose minds were really in a
situation to decide upon the whole case according to the testi-
mony."3 9 The court, therefore, held that: "light impressions which
ing that although friends and adversaries of convention's plan agreed on little else, they did
agree on value of trial by jury).
33. Id.
34. See COMMENTATORS ON THE CoNsrtrrLoN: PUBLIC AND PRrVATE 462 (state Historical
Society of Wisconsin 198 1) (citing Centinal II, Philadelphia Freeman's Journal, Oct. 24, 1787)
(criticizing failure to include provision that jury panels will be drawn "from the vicinage"); id.
at 243 (citing Strictures on the Proposed Constitution, Philadelphia Freeman's Journal, Sept. 26,
1787) (decrying convention's failure to enact specific provision mandating that jury verdicts
be reached by majority vote). These concerns were rectified by passage of the sixth amend-
ment. Id. at 242.
35. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Gas. 201, 202 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 694a).
36. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Gas. 49,49 (G.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692g) (editors'
comments on same); id. at 50-51 (commenting on desirability yet impossibility of locating
unaware citizens).
37. Id. at 50.
38. Id. (noting difference between juror who has personal prejudices and juror who is
prejudiced because of previously formed opinion).
39. Id. at 51.
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may fairly be supposed to yield to the testimony that may be offered,
which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that testi-
mony, constitute no sufficient objection to a juror. '40
Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted words did not, of course, end
the difficulties encountered by courts seeking to impanel juries in
notorious cases. An 1846 legal commentary expressed the author's
concern that mistaking ignorant jurors for impartial ones would ex-
clude informed citizens from juries:
Ours is the greatest newspaper reading population in the world;
not a man among us fit to serve as a juror, who does not read the
newspapers.... In the case of a particularly audacious crime that
has been widely discussed it is utterly impossible that any man of
common intelligence, and not wholly secluded from society,
should be found, who had not formed an opinion.4 1
This sentiment was voiced again in 1874 when the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court lamented that newspaper publicity may result in im-
portant cases being decided by jurors whose "dark minds have
never been smitten by the rays of intelligence." 42
B. Response of the United States Supreme Court
In 1878, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether a person who was aware of the facts of a case could serve
as a juror. In Reynolds v. United States,43 the Court rejected a motion
to overturn a conviction for bigamy based in part on the trial judge
having impaneled a juror who "'believed' he had formed an opin-
ion which he had never expressed, and which he did not think would
influence his verdict on hearing the testimony." 44
The Court began by acknowledging that to be impartial, as re-
quired by the sixth amendment, a juror must "be indifferent as he
stands unsworn." 45 It then discussed the unsettled state of the law
in the lower and English courts. The Court stated that while the
lower courts were not in agreement as to the "knowledge upon
which the opinion must rest in order to render the juror incompe-
tent, or whether the opinion must be accompanied by malice or ill-
will," they did agree that the opinion must be more than "a mere
impression." 46 The Court determined, citing ChiefJustice Marshall
40. Id.
41. Trial by Jury in New York, 9 Law Rep. 193, 198 (1846), quoted in ABA Standards Relat-
ing to Fair Trial and Free Press 21 (Approved Draft 1968).
42. O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 424, 428 (1874).
43. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
44. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57 (1878).
45. Id. at 154 (quoting COKE ON LiTrLErON 155b).
46. Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
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in Burr, that every opinion which a potential juror may hold need
not render that person unfit for jury service.47 It is up to the trial
judge, ChiefJustice Waite wrote, to determine, in each juror's case,
the line between opinion and partiality.48 Because the question in-
volves the determination of facts based on the evidence presented
to the trial court, the Supreme Court held that the finding of the
trial judge should be overturned by a reviewing court only for mani-
fest error.49
The Supreme Court went on to point out, in a surprisingly mod-
em vein, that when considering questions about opinions held by
potential jurors, reviewing courts "ought not to be unmindful of the
fact ... that jurors not infrequently seek to excuse themselves on
the ground of having formed an opinion, when, on examination, it
turns out that no real disqualification exists." 50 In such cases, the
jurors' manner while testifying often tells more about their opinion
than do their words. 51 Unless the challenger raises the presumption
of partiality by demonstrating that a juror actually holds a firm opin-
ion, the juror will not necessarily be excused; nor is refusal to ex-
cuse such a juror reversible error.52
Almost a century after Reynolds, the Supreme Court, in Irvin v.
Dowd,53 overturned a murder conviction for lack of an impartial jury
and, in the process, set forth the structural framework through
which juror prejudice might be demonstrated. The Court held that
some knowledge of the facts and issues alone will not necessarily
disqualify a person from jury service.54 It stated that:
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of
the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread
and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be
expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and
scarcely any of those best qualified to sit as jurors will not have
formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.
47. Id. at 155-56. Chief Justice Waite stated:
In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every case of public
interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelli-
gent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best
fitted forjurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or
some opinion in respect to its merits.
Id.
48. Id. at 156.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 156-57.
52. Id. at 157.
53. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
54. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
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This is particularly true in criminal cases. 55
The Court acknowledged that important cases are highly publi-
cized and often arouse the interest of the community.56 Therefore,
many of those best qualified to sit as jurors will have formed some
impression or opinion of the case.57 The Court found that an opin-
ion, unless it is so strong that it cannot be overcome by testimony
and evidence, is insufficient to disqualify a potential juror.58 Thus,
so long as "the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court," the ju-
ror will not be disqualified. 59
In the case before the Court, however, the trial transcript showed
that eight out of the twelve jurors stated during voir dire that they
thought the defendant was guilty.60 The Court found that "[w]ith
such an opinion permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say
that each could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliber-
ations."'6 ' In short, the Court found actual evidence of constitution-
ally impermissible bias among members of the jury.62 The Court,
however, also explained that even where the individual jurors have
offered assurance of impartiality, in some instances bias can be pre-
sumed if a tremendous amount of public passion surrounds a case.63
Irvin has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and lower courts
as articulating a two-prong approach to identifying bias among po-
tential jurors resulting from their knowledge or opinions about the
case. 64 First, actual bias might be demonstrated through voir dire
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (noting that this was particularly true in criminal cases).
58. Id. (explaining that if "mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused, without more, [was] sufficient to rebut the presumption of a pro-
spective juror's impartiality," it would be impossible standard to overcome).
59. Id. at 723.
60. Id. at 727.
61. Id. The Court explained that the "influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is
so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average
man." Id.
62. Id. (holding that evidence ofjurors' pre-trial opinions as to defendant's guilt or inno-
cence showed actual bias).
63. Id. at 728.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1180-83 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding
minimal media coverage of case satisfied neither bias prong); United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d
1270, 1298 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that defendant had failed to present evidence of actual
prejudice and judge's actions prevented possibility of presumed prejudice); Swindler v. Lock-
hart, 693 F. Supp. 760, 763 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (stating inquiry into possible prejudice stemming
from pretrial publicity requires two prong approach). There is a third avenue for identifying
bias among potential jurors which is not relevant to this Article. The Supreme Court has
permitted bias to be presumed among certain specific categories of persons, such as relatives
and employees of parties. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that presumption of actual bias is appropriate when juror is actual em-
ployee of prosecutor or if juror is close relative of participant); United States v. Scott, 854
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responses and other evidence. 65 Second, prejudice might be pre-
sumed from the circumstances surrounding the trial. 66
For a brief period following Irvin, the presumption of prejudice
received considerable attention from the Court.67 In Murphy v. Flor-
ida,68 however, the Supreme Court withdrew its reliance on this
method of identifying prejudice and began to insist on evidence of
actual prejudice in the jury box.69 Murphy involved a flamboyant
jewel thief, Murph the Surf, who first gained notoriety for his part in
the daring theft of the Star of India sapphire from a New York mu-
seum. 70 At issue in the case was whether exposure of potential ju-
rors to prejudicial information about the defendant's prior
convictions rendered them ineligible for jury service.7 1
The Supreme Court began by distinguishing Irvin as involving
"actual prejudice against the petitioner to a degree that rendered a
F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that implied bias can be found when juror is "actual
employee of the prosecuting agency"); United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1218-20
(3d Cir. 1986) (refusing to hold that juror, who was member of National Rifle Association in
case involving shooting, deserved implication of bias as in cases of relatives or employees).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 955-56 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing
proof of actual juror bias through voir dire responses); Tinsley v. Borg, 845 F.2d 520, 523-26
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding mere allegation that one juror was biased does not show actual bias);
Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 741-46 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing possibility of actual
juror bias when case highly publicized).
66. See, e.g., Grancorvitz v. Franklin, 890 F.2d 34, 36-38 (7th Cir. 1989) (commenting on
high level of publicity around case that must be shown in order to presume prejudice); Cum-
mings v. Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 1506 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (discussing case where 11 of 12jurors
had been exposed to pretrial publicity); Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1424-29 (1 Ith Cir.
1988) (discussing Ted Bundy's claim of presumed prejudice due to publicity surrounding his
murder trial).
67. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In Rideau, the Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's denial of a motion for change of venue where the defendant's confession had
been repeatedly televised prior to the trial. Id. at 726-27. The Court found that the commu-
nity in which the trial was held had been "pervasively exposed" to the "spectacle" of the
televised confession. Id. at 726. Therefore, juror prejudice could be presumed. Id. The
Court reached this determination without requiring evidence that the televised confession
actually resulted in any prejudice at the trial. Id.
Three years later, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court reversed another conviction on
account of the "carnival atmosphere" in the courtroom and among the press covering the
trial. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966). Again, no showing of actual prejudice
was required. Id. The Court, however, used Sheppard as an opportunity to articulate various
measures which lower courts should take in order to reduce the impact of the media on jury
trials. Id. at 358-62. It suggested that trial judges exercise greater control over the courtroom
and courthouse premises, insulate the witnesses, and proscribe extrajudicial statements by
any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulges prejudicial matters, identifies pro-
spective witnesses and their probable testimony, refers to guilt or innocence, or concerns the
merits of the case. Id. at 361. The Court also identified judicial techniques for minimizing
bias among potential jury members. Id. at 363. These techniques include continuing the case
until the publicity dies down, transferring the case to another venue, and sequestering poten-
tial jury members during voir dire. Id.; see infra notes 92-151 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing techniques judges use to identify and minimize impact ofjury impartiality).
68. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
69. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798-99 (1975).
70. Id. at 795.
71. Id.
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fair trial impossible." 72 The Court then distinguished cases in
which prejudice was presumed, on the basis that in such cases, per-
vasive media influence destroys the "solemnity and sobriety" that
prevents a fair trial from becoming a "verdict of the mob." 73 The
Court refused to interpret those cases as holding that exposing a
juror to information about a defendant's prior convictions or to
news accounts of the crime, without more, deprives the defendant of
due process. 74 Instead, it determined that a reviewing court must
look to the "totality of the circumstances" to determine the funda-
mental fairness of the trial.75
The Court reiterated its holding in Irvin that qualified jurors need
not be totally ignorant.76 Forjuror bias to be found, the defendant
must demonstrate the "actual existence" of an opinion in thejuror's
mind that raises the "presumption of partiality."' 77 The Court in
Murphy took special pains to point out that the issue is not "mere
familiarity with petitioner or his past" but rather "an actual predis-
position against him."7 8
Because, in the case before it, seven months had passed between
arrest and trial and most of the news reports were largely factual in
nature, the Murphy court held that there was no evidence of actual
prejudice against the defendant. 79 In the absence of evidence of ac-
tual prejudice in the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
trial, the Court refused to presume prejudice.8 0
The Supreme Court's evolution toward the principle that jurors
could be constitutionally impartial, even if they had been exposed to
information about the case prior to trial and even if they had formed
some opinions about the case, reached its apex in Patton v. Yount.81
In Patton, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder
and rape of an eighteen-year old high school student.82 The convic-
tion was overturned because Yount's constitutional rights had been
72. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 799.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 799-800 (discussing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)).
77. Id. at 800 (quoting Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723).
78. Id. at 800, n.4. The Court went on to say that "[io ignore these real differences in
the potential for prejudice would not advance the cause of fundamental fairness, but only
make impossible the timely prosecution of persons who are well-known in the community,
whether they be notorious or merely prominent." Id.
79. Id. at 802-03.
80. Id. at 803.
81. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
82. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1027 (1984).
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violated in the process of securing his confession.8 The defendant
was re-tried in the same community and was again convicted of first-
degree murder.8 4 The case reached the Supreme Court on petition
for habeas corpus relief 8 5
Publicity surrounding the second trial revealed the defendant's
prior conviction for murder, his confession, and his prior plea of
temporary insanity, none of which were admitted into evidence in
the second trial.86 All but two of the 126 persons in the venire had
heard of the case; eight of the fourteen jurors seated said that at one
time, they had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt.8 7
Although it would be difficult to imagine a case in which prejudice
could more easily be proven or presumed, the Court stated that
"[t]he relevant question is not whether the community remembered
the case, but whether the jurors at Yount's trial had such fixed opin-
ions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defend-
ant."88 The Court held that it could find no evidence of bias in the
voir dire transcript sufficient to overcome the presumption of cor-
rectness due to determinations of fact,8 9 and that it could not pre-
sume bias from the record of publicity surrounding the trial.90
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to permit
jury service by a person possessed of knowledge or opinions about
the case, provided that (1) the knowledge and opinions are not so
closely held that they cannot reasonably be put aside in the face of
evidence; and that (2) the publicity surrounding the case is not so
widespread or prejudicial as to render the person's assurances of
impartiality unbelievable.9 1 The primary lesson of the Court's rul-
ings in Murphy and Patton, however, is that the standard for proving
actual prejudice on the part of jurors is very high, and is a matter
about which the reviewing court owes special deference to the trial
83. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 277, 256 A.2d 464, 465-66 (1969) (holding
that because defendant was given no Miranda warnings, his confession was invalid).
84. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1028.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1029.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1035 (citing Irvin).
89. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1990) (mandating that determination of factual issue by
lower court, after rehearing on merits, carries presumption of correctness).
90. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1040.
91. Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988). In Harris, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the two standards as follows. Under the actual prej-
udice standard, the court must determine that the juror demonstrated "actual partiality or
hostility that could not be laid aside." Id. at 1363. To satisfy the presumed prejudice stan-
dard, the court may presume prejudice "when the record demonstrates that the community
where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity
about the crime." Id. at 1361.
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court. The standard for presuming prejudice may be impossible to
satisfy.92
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL REMEDIES
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted, judges rely on a vari-
ety of techniques to identify impartiality and to minimize its impact
in the courtroom. 93 These include change of venue, continuance,
voir dire, jury instructions, and jury deliberation. Judges and prose-
cutors generally believe that these existing remedies are effective
means for ensuring impartiality.94 A central problem with all of
these devices, however, is that, irrespective of more than a century
of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, there appears to be little
consensus on what an impartial jury really is. Is it a panel of people
without biases or opinions? Is it a panel on which the court has
sought to place a representative sample of biases, or an equal
number ofjurors biased in favor of and against the defendant? Or
is it a panel of people who believe that they can be fair and can
follow the law, in spite of their opinions? If so, must that belief be
supported by any evidence?
The resolution of these questions is important when selecting
techniques for assuring that an "impartial" jury-however it is de-
fined-is impaneled. Answering these questions alone, however, is
not enough. Even if judges agree on what an "impartial" jury is,
they still face the difficult-some say insurmountable-task of trying
to find one. The techniques that judges use in their attempt to ac-
complish this task are explored below.
A. Change of Venue
Change of venue involves moving the trial to another jurisdic-
tion.95 Courts are extraordinarily reluctant to grant motions for
92. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 233-35 (1982) (holding that bias may not be implied
from fact that sitting juror applied for job in district attorney's office; actual bias must be
proven) (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor concurred separately to express the view that
the majority opinion did not "foreclose the use of 'implied bias' in appropriate circum-
stances." Id. at 221 (O'ConnorJ., concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Stevens, dissented from the majority's holding that "the Constitution requires only that
the defendant be given an opportunity to prove actual bias." Id. at 228 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
93. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356-62 (1966) (delineating protective measures
that trial court should have taken).
94. See Carroll, Kerr, Alfini, Weaver, MacCoun & Feldman, Free Press and Fair Triak The
Role of Behavioral Research, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 192 (1986) (acknowledging that voir
dire, instructions to jurors, sequestration, continuance, additional peremptory challenges,
and gag orders on attorneys are all useful tools for dealing with bias).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988) (providing that judges may change trial site "in the inter-
est ofjustice" to location in which case could have been brought). Most states have similar
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change of venue, particularly if the motion is based solely on claims
of pre-trial publicity. 96 A judge may resist changing venue because
of a reluctance to admit that the defendant could only receive a fair
trial in another jurisdiction.97 Even in the case ofJack Ruby, where
by the time of the trial every citizen of Dallas might be expected to
have seen the film clip of Ruby shooting Lee Harvey Oswald, the
trial judge refused to grant a motion for change of venue. 98
Even when permitted, however, changing the venue of a trial may
violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to a trial before a
"jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." 99 Although the motion to change venue is almost al-
ways brought by the defendant, it effectively requires a defendant to
choose between two constitutional rights: the right to an impartial
jury and the right to a local jury. 00
Change of venue may also frustrate the local community's legiti-
mate interests in resolving the case.' 10 Moreover, it may be wholly
ineffective as a remedy for pretrial publicity when that publicity has
not been limited to the area in which the crime was committed.
Where in the United States can a jury unfamiliar with the acts of
Manuel Noriega and the United States invasion of Panama be
impaneled?
B. Continuance
Granting a continuance, which involves delaying the trial, 0 2 is an
statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 511 (McKinney 1976) (discussing motion for
"change of place of trial on ground that the county designated for that purpose is not a
proper county"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-83 (1983) (stating that defendant may ask that place of
trial be changed); CoLo. R. Civ. P. 98 (1977 & Supp. 1989) (allowing for change of venue
upon motion by defendant).
96. See Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV.
810, 819 (1961) (noting that change of venue is discretionary and that court denying such
motion can state that cure for prejudice is jury instructions).
97. Selecting Impartial Juries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Search for Justice, Panel One:
What Empirical Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest for Impartial-
ity, Annenberg Washington Program Conference, May 11, 1990, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 547, 563 (1990)
[hereinafter Panel One] (statement of Norbert L. Kerr) (discussing reasons why motions for
change of venue are rarely granted).
98. See M. BELLI, MY LIFE ON TRIAL 260-61 (1976) (discussing events surrounding Jack
Ruby's trial in Dallas).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra note 2 (providing relevant text of sixth amendment).
100. See generally Kafker, The Right to Venue and the Right to an Impartial Jury: Resolving the
Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. 'CI. L. REV. 729, 731-34 (1985) (examining problem
that arises when defendant refuses to allow change of venue, when change of venue is only
way to ensure fair trial).
101. See Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1015, 1049-52 (1990) (discussing injustice that arises when community
members, especially in minority communities, are excluded from juries).
102. Continuance involves the postponement of a hearing or trial to a subsequent day or
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equally dubious remedy. As with change of venue, courts are reluc-
tant to grant a motion for continuance, in part because of the bur-
dens "on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and fading
memories."10 3 Moreover, where granted, a lengthy continuance
may violate a defendant's sixth amendment right to a "speedy and
public trial." 10 4 Although continuance is among the least studied
judicial remedies for pretrial publicity, results of one study show
that a twelve day continuance was ineffective in curing jury bias cre-
ated by "emotional publicity," such as the publication of graphic
pictures of the crime scene.'0 5
C. Judicial Instructions
Judicial instructions, such as directions from the judge telling the
jury to ignore information learned outside of the courtroom,
although relied upon in almost every case, also have been demon-
strated to be ineffective.' 06 Judge Learned Hand called such in-
structions a "placebo," 10 7 requiring of the jury "a mental gymnastic
which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else. [sic]' 10 8
Similarly, psychologist Norbert Kerr stated that there has not been a
single study which indicates that judicial instructions limit the effects
of jury bias.10 9
time, usually upon the request of one of the parties. BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 321 (6th ed.
1990).
103. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (discussing problems with repeated or con-
tinued trials).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra note 2 (providing relevant text of sixth amendment).
105. Kramer, Kerr & Carroll, Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, andJuy Bias, 14 LAw. &
HUM. BEHAV. 409, 432 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, et al].
106. See infra note 109 (providing social scientists' critiques ofjury instructions as effective
cures for bias).
107. United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (stating that few people
can correct their thoughts or disregard evidence because of instructions to do so), aft'd, 352
U.S. 232 (1957).
108. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.) (noting that evidentiary rules
probably can impede search for truth), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932).
109. Panel One, supra note 97, at 562 (statement of Norbert L. Kerr).
In fact, in a recent article, authors Geoffrey Kramer, Norbert Kerr, and John Carroll have
found that strong admonition to ignore all publicity had no effect on jurors, and actually
strengthened the impact of factual publicity. Kramer, et al, supra note 105, at 430. The au-
thors found instructions "even less likely to offset the effects of emotionally arousing material
. ...." Id  at 412; see also Broeder, The University of Chicago Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 754
(1959) (stating that experimental juries which had been given inadmissible evidence were
sensitized to and focused on such evidence by judge's admonishments to ignore such evi-
dence); Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of SimulatedJuries,
18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 240, 249 (1976) (indicating that despite jury instructions to contrary,
majority of mock jurors considered inadmissible information in reaching decision); Thomp-
son, Fong & Rosenham, Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOLOGY 453, 461 (1981) (stating that jurors are likely to apply own standards and ignore
what judge says); Wolf& Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level ofJudcialAdmoni-
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D. Jury Deliberation
Jury deliberation' 10 takes place in every trial and is frequently
cited as an important tool in minimizing the impact of bias on the
verdict."' Some research supports this conclusion." 2 Other re-
search, however, suggests that group deliberation may be polarized
by individual opinions." 3 It is feared that a small bias at the individ-
ual level may be exacerbated by group deliberation."14
Two recent studies have shown that pretrial bias may affect the
ways in which jurors recall, recount, and weigh evidence, thus creat-
ing biased jury deliberations.' 15 According to Professor Kerr, jury
deliberation tends to exaggerate the initial bias of individual ju-
rors. 1 16 Because of the possible bias amplification resulting from
group deliberation, some jury researchers have concluded, jury de-
liberation should not be viewed as a general remedy for pretrial
publicity exposure." 17
E. Voir Dire
The remedy for pretrial publicity most favored by judges," i8 and
the primary means through which most courts seek to determine the
tion to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 205, 216 (1977)
(finding that specific judicial admonishments do not reduce amount ofjuror bias).
110. Jury deliberation is the process in which a properly formed jury, within the secrecy of
the jury room, analyzes, discusses, and weighs the evidence brought before it with the goal of
reaching a verdict based upon applicable law and facts. Rushing v. State, 565 S.W.2d 893,
895 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (rejecting defendant's contention that jury separation after case
created flaw injury deliberation process).
111. See Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CONTEmP. PROBS. 205, 206
(1989) (explaining that jury deliberation is beneficial because it forces jurors to realize limited
nature of individual perceptions).
112. Id.; see Hans & Doob, supra note 109, at 236 (explaining that group discussion by
juries is useful because logical discussion with others may "wash out" effects of individual
decision making); Kaplan & Miller, Reducing the Effects ofJury Bias, 36 J. PERSONALTY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 1443, 1454 (1978) (stating that deliberation ameliorates pretrialjury bias); Shaw,
A Comparison of Individuals and Small Groups in the Rational Solution of Complex Problems, 44 Am.J.
PSYCHOLOGY 491, 504 (1932) (concluding small groups are more proficient than individuals at
reaching correct decisions).
113. See Myers & Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon 83 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 602, 602-
03 (1976) (indicating that decisions ofjury may differ from individual jurors' views because
group situation deemphasizes importance of caution).
114. See Hans & Doob, supra note 109, at 235, 237 (discussing differences between group
decision making and individual decision making).
115. Kramer, et al, supra note 105, at 431; Casper, Benedict & Perry,Juror Decision Making,
Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 291, 308 (1989) (concluding that pre-
trial publicity and stricken evidence create bias at both individual and group level).
116. Panel One, supra note 97, at 562 (statement of Norbert L. Kerr).
117. See Kramer, et alsupra note 105, at 413.
118. Carroll, et aL, supra note 94, at 192 (stating that judges are strong believers in voir
dire).
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qualifications of citizens to sit on a jury, is voir dire. ' 9 Through this
procedure, the judge and/or, in some jurisdictions, attorneys, ques-
tion potential jurors in an effort to determine whether they can be
impartial. The Supreme Court has repeatedly lauded the benefits of
voir dire. For example, in Patton, the Court stated that "[i]t is fair to
assume that the method we have relied on since the beginning, e.g.,
United States v. Burr, usually identifies bias."' 120
There has, however, been little research about the effectiveness of
voir dire as a means of identifying prejudice.' 2 1 The research that
is available suggests that voir dire is ill-suited to this important
task.' 22 Many critics charge that voir dire fails to elicit accurate or
honest responses from potential jurors, or members of the ve-
nire.' 23 Repeated studies have concluded that jurors tend not to
speak out during voir dire, nor admit to their true prejudices and
preconceptions. 124 Furthermore, jurors may even lie during open
court questioning.125 Many trial attorneys and judges believe jurors
119. Siebert, Trial Judges' Opinions on Prejudicial Publicity in FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 6-8
(Bush ed. 1970) (showing percentage of judges relying on voir dire).
120. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984). In fact, the Court has cited to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opinion in In re Application
of National Broadcasting Co., for the proposition that voir dire has been long recognized as an
effective method of uncovering pre-trialjury bias, especially when voir dire is conducted care-
fully and thoroughly. Id. at 1038, n.13 (quoting In re Application of National Broadcasting
Co., 653 F.2d 609, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). In addition, the Court cited with approval to a
concurring opinion by the Third Circuit's Judge Garth, for the broad proposition that thor-
ough and skillfully conducted voir dire should prove an effective method of identifying juror
bias, even in a community saturated with adverse publicity. Yount, 467 U.S. at 1030 (quoting
Yount v. Patton, 710 F.2d 956, 979 (3d Cir. 1983) (Garth, J., concurring).
121. Bronson, The Effectiveness of Voir Dire In Discovering Prejudice In High-Publicity
Cases: An Archival Study of the Minimization Effect 3 (June 8, 1989) (paper prepared for
25th anniversary meeting of Law and Society Association) (noting lack of social science litera-
ture on general effectiveness of voir dire).
122. See Ellsworth, supra note 110, at 206-07 (suggesting goal of voir dire is incorrectly set
to find incompetent jurors, rather than those with expertise or above average educations); see
also Broeder, supra note 109, at 753 (implying that voir dire is tool to jurors' indoctrination to
particular view, rather than searching for qualified jurors).
123. Carroll, Speaking the Truth: Voir Dire in the Capital Case, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 199,
200-01 (1979) (describing problems associated with conducting successful voir dire examina-
tions). Accurate and honest answers are unlikely because, practically speaking, it is rare to
find a juror willing to openly and honestly discuss his or her beliefs and biases. Id.; see Broe-
der, supra note 109, at 748 (indicating voir dire questions aimed at obtaining impartial jurors
may actually result injuries more apt to convict); see also Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 220
(Miss. 1985) (stating group voir dire is unable to determine influences of substantial pre-trial
publicity due to principles of group psychology-jurors are extremely reluctant to expose
their biases in front of group).
124. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503, 528
(1965) (concluding that jurors are likely to lie, either consciously or unconsciously, when pub-
licly questioned about views).
125. See Bush, The Case for Expansive Voir Dire, 2 Law & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 9, 13 (1976)
(stating that potential jurors often lie to remain on jury);Jones,Judge Versus Attorney-Conducted
Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 131, 134 (1987)
(indicating that formal courtroom environment hinders juror self-disclosure); see also Rasp-
berry, The Mayor & the Judge, The Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1990, at 25 (discussing speech by
19911 IMPARTIAL JURORS 651
use confessions of prejudice as a convenient method of avoiding
jury duty.126
Social influences may also cause voir dire to be ineffective. For
instance, it is unlikely that someone will admit publicly to being a
bigot. 127 Potential jurors are influenced by a desire to get the
"right" answer, find approval from the judge, and be in the major-
ity. 128 In addition, as one commentator noted, "[p]rospective jurors
observe what happens to those that are not sufficiently uninformed:
the judge asks them to leave; they have failed the test as fair and
impartial jurors."129
The fact that fewer jurors admit to possible bias as the voir dire
questioning progresses suggests that potential jurors learn from
their colleagues' answers the "right" answers to the voir dire ques-
tions. °30 This problem was demonstrated in Copeland v. State,13s a
case in which a black defendant was tried for the murder of a
nineteen-year old white woman. 3 2 In Copeland, four out of the first
nine people questioned said that they could not be impartial.' 33 Of
the remaining fifty-two, only one admitted to bias.' 3 4 One commen-
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson stating that jurors who expressed reasonable doubt about
charges against Mayor Barry were lying); York, Barry's Lawyers Claim Trial Judge Was Biased, The
Washington Post, Feb. 12, 1991, at B3, col. I (discussing motion filed by Barry's attorneys
requesting consideration ofJudgeJackson's speech in Barry's appeal and alleging that speech
reveals prejudice of judge against Barry at time of sentencing); see generally Moran, Cutler &
Loftus,Jury Selection in Major Controlled Substance Trials: The Need for Extended Voir Dire, 3 FOREN-
SIC REP. 331 (1990).
126. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878) (indicatingjuror confession of
bias may be tool to avoid jury duty). More than a century ago, ChiefJustice Waite in Reynolds
suggested "[w]e ought not to be unmindful of the fact we have so often observed in our
experience that jurors not infrequently seek to excuse themselves on the ground of having
formed an opinion when, on examination, it turns out that no real disqualification exists." See
generally Bronson, supra note 121, at 25 n.91 (stating it is surprising to find anyone who tells
Court they can be impartial).
127. See Bronson, supra note 121, at 54 n.182; see also Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An
Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 510-14 (1965) (arguing that voir dire is grossly ineffec-
tive both in weeding out unfavorable jurors and in eliciting data which would show particular
jurors as unfavorable); Carroll, supra note 122, at 203 (suggesting that where race is issue,
defendant should be allowed to question jurors directly in order to gauge true juror reaction).
128. See Broeder, supra note 109, at 748 (implicating that specific questioning on view-
points may create jurors likely to vote in manner which judge sought to avoid); see also Bush,
supra note 125, at 17 (stating that jurors' answers may be controlled by desire to please judge);
Suggs & Sales,Juror Self-Disclosure in Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. LJ. 245, 259
(1981) (suggesting that group voir dire questions tend to elicit uniform responses due to
individual need to conform).
129. See Bronson, supra note 121, at 29 (noting that judges use language like "step down"
or "step aside" when dismissing jurors); Suggs & Sales, supra note 128, at 259-60 (discussing
effects of juror desire to associate with group during voir dire).
130. See Bush, supra note 125, at 13 (suggesting that jurors may actually manipulate an-
swers in order to remain on jury).
131. 457 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1984).
132. Copeland v. State, 457 So. 2d 1012, 1014-15 (Fla. 1984).
133. Bronson, supra note 121, at 25 n.91.
134. Id.
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tator refers to this as the "minimization effect"-potential jurors
minimize their possible bias in response to voir dire questioning.1 35
In addition, many jurors underestimate their exposure to the case.
Follow-up questions, however, demonstrate that they have consider-
able knowledge about the facts.'36 For instance, in Copeland, a juror,
who denied having any knowledge about the case, admitted upon
further questioning to having read about and discussed the case.' 3 7
Even when the voir dire is conducted in the judges' chambers,
away from public and press scrutiny, the procedure is rife with im-
pediments to identifying impartial jurors. For instance, judges and
lawyers often indicate the answers that they want.' 38 In Copeland,
the judge asked: "You haven't read about [the case] or heard
[about] it on television or anything or discussed it with anybody
whereby you might have formed an opinion about the case?"' 39 Or,
"[w]ell, from what you're telling me, then, you could sit here and be
fair and impartial and listen to the evidence as it comes to you, as it
is presented in this courtroom and based solely on that
evidence?"140
The specificity or subject matter of the questions is not the only
area of difficulty. Even when the judge or attorneys wish to ask the
right questions, they find that voir dire questions are difficult to
frame. General questions addressing a prospective juror's fairness
and impartiality fail to focus the juror's attention on specific
135. Id. at 28-29 (stating that potential jurors' desire to appear like "good citizens" results
in minimizing personal bias).
136. See Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 221 (Miss. 1985) (stating that many jurors do not
know that they hold any opinion until questioned).
137. Bronson, supra note 121, at 41-42.
138. See Broeder, supra note 109, at 748 (noting suggestiveness of voir dire questioning).
139. See Bronson, supra note 121, at 37 (citing voir dire transcript from Copeand).
140. Id. at 46 (citing voir dire transcript from Copeland); see Loftus & Palmer, Reconstruction
of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13J. VERBAL
LEARING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 586-88 (1974) (stating form of question markedly affects
answer). Commentators are split on whether very specific voir dire questions are useful.
Judge Stanley Sporkin of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has
stated:
Another question I ask when a person has some knowledge of the matter is whether
they can forget about what they have read or heard about this case, whether they can
take the facts as presented in the courtroom, and whether they can decide the case on
those facts. Nine times out of ten, they certainly can.
Selecting Impartial Juries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Search for Justice, Panel Two: Current
Judicial Practice, Legal Issues, and Existing Remedies, Annenberg Washington Program Conference, May
11, 1990, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 573, 575 (1990) [hereinafter Panel Two) (statement ofJudge Stan-
ley Sporkin). Defense attorney Ronald Olson feels that this type of specific question "is prob-
ably the worst single voir dire question to ask." Id. at 579 (statement of Ronald Olson).
Similarly, law professor Stephen Saltzburg states that "Uj]urors who confess to being predis-
posed are permitted, if not coerced by the trial judge, to state that they will be fair and thus to
avoid challenges [for] cause." Saltzburg, Understanding the Jury with the Help of Social Science, 83
MicH. L. REv. 1120, 1137 (1985).
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problems. 14' Jurors often do not understand what information is
prejudicial or improper or know that they possess such informa-
tion. 142 How can the attorney probe for specific prejudicial opin-
ions without emphasizing the information that he or she wants the
juror not to have? 143 In fact, the very act of questioning about bias
may induce a counter bias.144
Limiting the power to question jurors to the judge also may not
adequately protect the defendant's sixth amendment rights; in fact,
it may increase the ineffectiveness of voir dire.' 45 Judicial question-
ing often inhibits juror candor. 146 The judge's questions may even
lock jurors into their "good-citizen" responses, thus preventing
later questions by the attorneys from uncovering the jurors' real
feelings.' 47
Haste, as well as the nature and detail of voir dire questions, may
also taint the jury selection process. Both judges and lawyers tend
to hurry through voir dire; as the process drags on, they speed up
the questioning. For example, in Copeland, voir dire of the first four
jurors took sixty-one pages of transcript; the remaining forty-nine
took 161 pages. 148 As voir dire continues, the questioner may be
reluctant to ask follow-up questions because of time constraints. 149
Overexposure in the media may ultimately control who partici-
pates in questioning thejury. In some cases, the judge may not con-
duct any individualized voir dire at all before excluding members of
the venire because of exposure to press accounts of the case. 150
Judge Stanley Sporkin of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia has stated that in one trial which was the sub-
ject of considerable publicity, "I merely asked the panel how many
141. Bronson, supra note 121, at 44.
142. Id. (recalling how potential juror, after being questioned more in depth, was found to
possess substantial knowledge of case where she originally said she knew little about
incident).
143. Id.
144. See Hans, Death byJury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 155 (K. Haas &J. In-
cardi eds. 1988) (stating that questions aimed at determining juror's attitudes about capital
punishment may produce jury predisposition to render guilty verdict and implement death
sentence).
145. See Bush, supra note 125, at 16 (suggesting that judges are too concerned with dura-
tion of voir dire and may place efficiency over fairness to defendant).
146. See Jones, supra note 125, at 134 (concluding that voir dire by judges leads to less
candid responses than by attorneys because of perceived social distance between jurors and
judge).
147. Bronson, supra note 121, at 44.
148. Id. at 53.
149. See il (indicating that as voir dire drags on, time becomes serious concern).
150. See Suggs & Sales, supra note 128, at 259 (indicating that individual questioning is
matter ofjudicial discretion and is often not used prior to excluding jurors in well-publicized
case).
1991] 653
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:631
of them had heard about this case. Maybe a third said they had; so I
excluded them .... "151
Moreover, the problem that plagues all techniques for identifying
and remedying bias-a lack of consensus as to what an impartial ju-
ror really is-is particularly problematic in the case of voir dire. If
an impartial juror is someone without bias, judges are wasting the
public's time and money conducting voir dire, because it is impossi-
ble to assemble twelve people without opinions or prejudices. If,
however, an impartial juror is one who can apply the law irrespec-
tive of his or her views, then voir dire must be targeted at identifying
those people and testing whether their opinions will obstruct fair
deliberation, rather than focusing on possible exposure to media
coverage about the case.' 52
Although estimates as to the degree of ineffectiveness differ, so-
cial science research and the experience of judges and attorneys
suggest that existing techniques for minimizing the impact of bias-
change of venue, continuance, jury instructions, jury deliberation,
and voir dire-do not adequately guarantee that a fair and impartial
jury will be seated. Yet courts, perhaps believing that no other al-
ternatives exist, continue to rely on these inadequate remedies.
III. THE CONCEPT OF AN "IMPARTIAL" JURY IN AN AGE OF MASS
COMMUNICATIONS
Resolving the issues created when members of the venire are ex-
posed to pre-trial publicity, particularly considering the ineffective-
ness of existing techniques as presently employed, requires a clear
understanding of the roles juries and jurors are to fill and the quali-
ties that they must possess to do so successfully. As is discussed
below, social science has a vital function to perform in that process.
A. The Role ofJuries
The United States Supreme Court has identified a number of es-
151. Panel Two, supra note 140, at 575 (statement ofJudge Stanley Sporkin).
152. Stout, The Problem with Jury Selection, or, Raise Your Hand if You Are Prudiced or Unfair,
THE CHAMPION, Nov. 1987, at 19. Defense attorney Michael L. Stout summed up many of the
concerns about voir dire:
Everyone has a problem with jury selection--everyone. Jurors snicker with insecurity
at having their names called for questioning. We lawyers are confused as to the
meaning of the information we receive, intimidated at th5 thought of appearing fool-
ish during voir dire, yet are ill-prepared for questioning. Judges treat the process
like a tail-gate party, an event which is sociable but largely irrelevant to the game




sential roles that juries play in the American judicial system. For
instance, according to the Court, one important function ofjuries is
to protect citizens against "arbitrary law enforcement,"' 153 "the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor,"'154 and "the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge."' 155 Juries interpose "the common sense judgment
of a group of laymen" between the accused and his or her ac-
cuser. 156 The jury function is largely symbolic and may serve to re-
inforce social mores concerning appropriate behavior.1 57
Juries also play an important role in preserving social order. As
one scholar explains, so long as trials-and therefore juries-appear
to be a viable method for resolving controversies, "citizens will
bring their disputes to the legal system rather than settle them in the
streets." 158 In addition, trials provide an apparently neutral means
for legitimating the state's power over its citizenry and "its claim of
a monopoly over physical violence." 159
Despite the Supreme Court's rhetoric on the importance ofjuries
in determining truth, 160 objective truth may not be a goal of the
judicial system. Instead, courts look to juries for legally accurate ver-
dicts, not factually accurate ones.' 6 ' It is clear that accuracy and
efficiency are plainly not the highest priorities of the judicial system,
because a host of legal rules run directly contrary to those goals.
For instance, the law requires a presumption of innocence or that
guilt in criminal matters be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
153. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 87 (1970).
154. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
155. Id.
156. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (describing how juries advance purpose of preventing gov-
ernment oppression); see generally Loftus & Greene, Twelve Angry People: The Collective Mind of
the Jury, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1433 (1984).
157. See Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66
IND. LJ. 137, 164-65 (1990) (stating that trials symbolize importance of individual autonomy
and government respect for individual rights and jury symbolizes democratic ideals); see also
A. DE TOCoQuEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 249 (Ist ed. 1835) (J. Meyer & M. Lerner eds.
1966). Tocqueville states that juries spread "respect for the courts' decisions and the idea of
right throughout all cases,. . . teach men equity in practice, [and] ... teach each individual not
to shirk responsibility for his own acts .... " Id. at 252. Juries also "invest each citizen with a
sort of magisterial office [that] make all men feel that they have duties toward society and that
they take a share in its government. Id. Tocqueville concludes that juries "should be re-
garded as a free school which is always open and in which each juror learns his rights ... and
is given practical lessons in the law .... " Id.
158. Tanford, supra note 157, at 165 (1990).
159. Id.
160. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (describing trial as "truth-determin-
ing process"); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (hypothesizing that purpose of
law is to "advance the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials"); United
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (indicating that "arriving at the truth is a funda-
mental goal of our legal system"); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (finding
"the normally predominant principle [is that] of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth").
161. Tanford, supra note 157, at 163-64.
1991] 655
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:631
Moreover, the trial system "encourages lawyers to conceal and sup-
press damaging information, exaggerate the significance of
favorable evidence, and to try to deceive the jury about the impor-
tance of facts or the way the law works."' 62
B. The Role ofJurors
The various remedies described in Part II above, and the frequent
association of "impartial" with "unaware," create an assumption
that ideal jurors are ignorant jurors. It is, however, a legal fiction
that "the jury operates on a blank slate, influenced only by what it
hears and sees in court, and influenced by predispositions and ex-
pectations."1 63 The legal system, in fact, values jurors "who are
aware of what is going on in the community and who stay
informed."16>4
Other countries which rely on juries, such as Canada and Great
Britain, have rejected the practice of questioning jurors about their
background and attitudes, except in unusual circumstances. 165
These countries recognize the obvious fact that every juror brings
opinions, biases, and prejudices to the jury box. 166 Juries are used,
rather than a judge or a single juror, because they are supposed to
represent the interests and the breadth of their communities' moral
sense.
167
If the jury is to perform the many functions assigned to it-safe-
guarding liberty, protecting citizens against the government, repre-
senting the community, preserving social order, and determining
guilt or innocence-the jury must be composed of informed citizens
who are representative of the community. Jurors need to reflect the
community's collective interests and experiences. 168 The same rea-
soning that supports the Supreme Court's refusal to permit exclu-
sion of blacks and women from juries applies to the exclusion of
162. Id. at 162-64.
163. Diamond, Casper & Ostergren, Blindfolding the Jury, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247,
251 (1989) (stating that jurors come to task with range of both accurate and inaccurate per-
ceptions concerning specific parties and trials in general).
164. Id. at 251-52; see Panel Two, supra note 140, at 581 (statement of jay B. Stephens)
(arguing that government benefits from intelligent, well-informed jurors).
165. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 48-49 (recounting views from attorneys of
several countries and their opinions on American jury selection process).
166. Id. at 48.
167. Id. As one British barrister declared: "[Clertainly in this country the whole basis of
the system is that you are presuming you are entrusting cases to jurors. And so you must, if
you're going to ask people to do a job, then I think you must trust them." Id.
168. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (noting that American concept of
jury trial contemplates jury drawn from cross-section of community); Hernandez v. Texas,




well-informed, curious, even opinionated people from juries.169
As Judge Irving R. Kaufman, head of the federal judiciary's Com-
mittee on the Operation of the Jury System, stated in his testimony
before Congress:
If the law is to reflect the moral sense of the community, the whole
community-and not just a special part-must help shape it. If
the jury's verdict is to reflect the community's judgement-the
whole community's judgement-jurors must be fairly selected
from a cross-section of the whole community, not merely a seg-
ment of it.17 0
Judge Stanley Sporkin has noted that under common law, jurors
were "supposed to be local citizens who knew something about what
was going on .... 1, 71 Similarly, the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, Jay B. Stephens, stated that:
[F]rom the perspective of the government .... it is generally to
our advantage to have intelligent jurors who listen to the evi-
dence, who evaluate the evidence, and who do not go off on extra-
neous kinds of issues. That purpose is served, I think, by
informed jurors, by jurors who are an integral part of the commu-
nity, who participate in the community, who are aware of what is
going on in the community and who stay informed. If you elimi-
nate people across the board who have read something, heard
something, watched something, seen something, or talked to
somebody, then it seems to me you have essentially prejudiced the
case against the government at the start.1 72
Ronald Olson, a defense lawyer and former president of the
American Bar Association Section of Litigation, agreeing with the
United States Attorney, stated that "categorical elimination of peo-
ple who have been exposed to press coverage is as prejudicial as the
elimination based on race." 1T
169. See generally Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (requiring
states which choose to provide grand and petit juries to select members without racial bias);
Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947) (using gross statistical disparity in racial composi-
tion ofjuries to find equal protection violation); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946) (requiring juries to be drawn from cross-section of community); Norris v. Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935) (finding state action precluding blacks fromjury service solely because of
race to be unconstitutional); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (determining that grand
jury racial exclusion by any state entity denies defendant equal protection); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that fourteenth amendment equal protection clause
prohibits exclusion of black jurors).
170. Subcommittee on Improvement in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Hearings on Federal Jury Selection, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1967).
171. Panel Two, supra note 140, at 575 (statement ofJudge Stanley Sporkin).
172. Id. at 581 (statement ofJay B. Stephens).
173. Id. at 578 (statement ofRonald Olson). Olson argued that this is particularly difficult
for those who are defending institutions because it reduces the opportunity-for rational ap-
peal and increases the likelihood of emotional appeal. Id.
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Therefore, while jurists agree that jurors need to be impartial, im-
partiality, as defined by the Supreme Court and the experience of
other countries that use jury systems, does not mean uninformed or
unopinionated. It does not require an unrealistic, undesirable, and
unobtainable robot-like ability to disregard prior knowledge,
whether obtained via the media or through first-hand experience.
Persons with such traits, if they exist, are poor choices for jurors. 174
According to the Supreme Court, impartiality is not compromised
by "mere familiarity with petitioner or his past," but by "an actual
predisposition against him." 175 Impartial means willingness to hear
the facts as presented in court and to evaluate those facts in light of
experience and common sense. 176 Impartial jurors make a con-
scious effort to hear and evaluate fairly, but we should recognize
frankly that they will never be entirely successful.
Regular exposure to media, however, may improve their chance
of succeeding.177 In fact, the skills of discernment that most citizens
exercise and refine daily in evaluating the barrage of news, advertis-
ing, and rhetoric presented by the media may help jurors to be both
capable and impartial. 178
Moreover, competent jurors are not so easily led by the media. 179
The recent inability of the jury to reach a verdict on twelve counts in
the cocaine and perjury trial of District of Columbia Mayor Marion
Barry should give pause to those who believe that a jury is easily
174. See Fein, UninformedJurors Put Justice at Risk, USA Today, Feb. 9, 1989, at 8A. Bruce
Fein, a former General Counsel of the Federal Communications Commission, wrote with re-
gard to jury selection for the trial of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North:
The trial judge has disqualified as potential jurors persons who watched or read
the riveting testimony North was compelled to give the congressional Iran-Contra
committees and a worldwide TV audience in 1987. The minuscule remainder eligi-
ble for jury service have either been understudies of Rip Van Winkle or congenitally
somnolent in the world of government. They are incompetent for the jury role.
Id.
Fein concluded with the words of ChiefJustice William Howard Taft: "['ihe jury system
needs citizens trained to the exercise of the responsibilities ofjurors." Balzac v. Porto [sic]
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922) (describing difficulty foreign legal culture may have in adopt-
ing Anglo-American system of trial by jury).
175. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975) (stating that fair trial does not require
jury to be totally ignorant of facts and issues involved).
176. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (stating that focus of impartiality deter-
mination should be willingness ofjuror to lay aside any opinions and decide case based on
facts presented in court).
177. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794,801 (1975) (describing views of juror who stated
that media's account of defendant's prior criminal activities led juror to believe that defendant
was being singled out for suspicion of new crimes).
178. But see Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725-27 (concluding that jury was prejudiced by extensive
exposure to media).
179. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802 (diminishing significance of media coverage of defend-
ant's prior crimes).
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swayed by the press.' 8 0 In that case, following a barrage of press
stories about the Mayor's arrest and legal maneuvers and specula-
tion about his political future, the jury watched a videotape of Mayor
Barry smoking crack cocaine, and heard Barry's defense counsel ac-
knowledge that the Mayor had used drugs, while the Mayor testified
before a grand jury that he had never used drugs. Still, the jury
acquitted Barry on one count and refused to convict him on twelve
of the thirteen others.' 8 ' This suggests that "jurors really are more
skeptical than you would think they are about what they hear, read,
and see.' 8 2
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant's right to trial by
impartial jury, not impartial jurors. 8 3 Protecting this right does not
depend on finding jurors with no opinions or prejudices, but rather
on the rough and tumble interaction of twelve members of the com-
munity, and the experiences and knowledge they bring into the jury
box. Their verdict is not merely the sum of twelve independent
votes; it is the product of the deliberation, of the interaction be-
180. See United States v. Barry, Criminal Case No. 90-0068 (D.D.C. 1990).
181. Id.; see also Pear, Verdict Called Rebuke to Federal Prosecutors, The New York Times, Aug.
11, 1990, § 1, at 12, col. 5 (stating that Mayor Barry was convicted on single misdemeanor
drug possession count, acquitted on another possession count, and mistrial declared on 12
other counts).
An even more dramatic result was reached in the drug trial ofJohn DeLorean, where ajury
acquitted the former car manufacturer, despite a videotape showing DeLorean purchasing
cocaine and toasting the success of his illegal venture. See generally S. BRiLL, TRIAL BY JURY
201-65 (1989) (discussing DeLorean case). Fred Graham, Chief Anchor and Managing Editor
of The American Trial Network and former CBS News law correspondent, described the ex-
aggerated impact of the media as follows:
I first began to suspect that our lawyerlike way of addressing this issue had swept
off the track when I was assigned by CBS to cover a series of some of the most
sensational trials of the century. It became absolutely clear to me that jurors were
absolutely unphased by all of that broadcasting that my colleagues and I had been doing
on television. It first struck me with regard to the Maurice Stans case in Watergate.
He was acquitted, and we said, "how can this be?" Then, over the years, I covered a
drumbeat of cases, including the trials of John Hinkley, John Connelly, John
DeLorean. John DeLorean was a man who was seen committing the alleged crime on
television, and he was acquitted. Then, of course, in the Watergate cases themselves,
although some defendants were convicted, there were some acquittals ....
I was persuaded in the Watergate case, as in the others, that the jurors were im-
pressed that they had been given great power. As citizens they were given responsi-
bility over the high and the mighty. They were not going to let someone like me tell
them what to think because I had been on television two and a half minutes on a few
nights when they had sat through six weeks of a trial; it was so clear to me that we
were not affecting that process.
Selecting ImpartialJuries: Must Ignorance Be a Virtue in Our Search for Justice, Keynote Address: The
Impact of Television on the Jury System: Ancient Myths and Modern Realism, Annenberg Washington
Program Conference, May 11, 1990, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 623, 624-26 (1990) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions ommitted).
182. See Panel Two, supra note 140, at 592 (statement ofJay B. Stephens).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see supra note 2 (providing language of sixth amendment).
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tween the twelve sets of experiences and knowledge, and thus a re-
flection of the community. As Professors Zeisel and Diamond write:
The law recognizes that jurors cannot perceive and evaluate the
evidence before them without being affected by their attitudes and
beliefs, and thus it insists that the differing values held by the ju-
rors be adequately mixed. The insistence that the values of the juy be
reflective of the distribution of values that exist in the community provides the
law with an objective standard against which the 'fairness" of the jury can
be measured: A representative jury, then, is the first approximation to the
ideal jury. 184
Thus, the term "jury selection" is a misnomer. Attorneys and
judges do not select juries. Instead, in the words of defense attor-
ney Olson, they de-select "those [individual members of the venire]
who have particular biases against you that you think would be
unfair." 85
Therefore, extensive voir dire and challenges-permitting attor-
neys to de-select their way to a panel less representative of the com-
munity-may prove a far greater threat to the fundamental fairness
of the verdict than exposure to any media coverage. While social
science research has raised many questions about the fairness of the
outcome of the interaction between jurors, it is clear that if the
membership of the panel is skewed by the selection process, then
the fundamental guarantee of fairness-the diversity and breadth of
experiences and views-is likely to be compromised. 8 6
C. The Role of Social Science
Social science has a great deal to contribute not only to the debate
over impartial jurors, but also to the practical effort to impanel im-
partial juries. Justice Frankfurter, never a friend to the use of social
science in the courtroom, lamented that as of 1952,
[s]cience with all its advances has not given us instruments for de-
termining when the impact of such newspaper exploitation has
spent itself or whether the powerful impression bound to be made
184. Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges onjury and Verdict: An Experiment in
Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 531 (1978) (emphasis added); see also Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 226 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (insisting that jury be selected
from representative cross-section of community and stating that selection procedures that
exclude significant portions of population, and thus increase risk of bias, are invalid).
185. See Panel Two, supra note 140, at 580 (statement of Ronald Olson).
186. Reducing the size ofjuries or permitting less than unanimous verdicts in criminal
trials, both of which are permitted by the Supreme Court, may also compromise the represen-
tative nature, and therefore counteracting perspectives, of thejury. See generally V. HANS & N.
VIDMAR, supra note 24, at 165-76 and sources cited therein (discussing ramifications of utiliz-




by such inflaming articles as here preceded the trial can be dissi-
pated in the mind of the average juror by the tame and often pe-
destrian proceedings in court. 187
But, since Justice Frankfurter's statement, social science has focused
considerable attention on the practices of courts, particularly relat-
ing to juries. It can help us better understand how bias really oper-
ates and, therefore, help courts identify jurors who may not be able
to be impartial. Social scientists may also facilitate potential jurors'
understanding of what they need to do in order to be as fair as
possible.
Social science helps critique existing remedies for minimizing the
impact of bias. 8 As a result, it helps us formulate better methods
and employ them more effectively to reduce particularly overwhelm-
ing or distorting biases. Analysis of empirical research helps us
think more clearly and effectively about juries and their interaction
with judges and attorneys.18 9
Social science may also focus our attention on forces in the jury
box which are more powerful and distorting than exposure to press
reports. For example, charges of racial politics have dominated the
recent trial of District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry on drug and
perjury charges, and trial of the three black youths convicted of rap-
ing and beating a young white woman in New York's Central
Park. 190 Similarly, in the recent District of Columbia murder trial of
black defendant Darryl Smith, a juror revealed that she and nine
other jurors agreed to acquit despite their belief that the man was
guilty because the "foreman said she didn't want to send anymore
young black men to jail, even if he did kill that young man over
drugs." 19 1 Because of cases such as these, courtrooms are being
viewed as places where conflicts are intensified rather than
resolved.192
187. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
188. See supra notes 92-161 and accompanying text (critiquing change of venue, continu-
ance, jury instructions, jury deliberation, and voir dire as bias remedies).
189. See generally Bronson, supra note 121 (using empirical studies to analyze effectiveness
of voir dire in high publicity cases). See also Moran, supra note 124, at 24-26 (listing empirical
data relied upon for author's critique of voir dire process).
190. See United States v. Barry, Criminal Case No. 90-0068 (D.D.C. 1990); Treadwell,
Blaming a Hidden Enemy; More Blacks Are Saying They're Targets Of A Conspiracy That Includes
Problems Of Their Leaders And Drugs On Their Streets Some Fear The Plot Theories Mask Real Problems,
Los Angeles Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at Al, col. I (stating many blacks feel prosecution of
Mayor Barry is racially motivated); see also McCarthy, Pinning Hopes onJury Prudence, Newsday,
June 18, 1990, at 8 (city ed.) (discussing importance of having diverse jury in Central Park
jogger rape trial because trial is "tinged with racial overtones").
191. Klaidman, Racial Politics in the Jury Room, Legal Times, Apr. 23, 1990, at 1.
192. Justice in Black and White, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1990, at 36 (describing courtrooms and
trials as "the new racial battlegrounds").
1991]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:631
Confusion and misunderstanding may also impede justice in the
jury box.' 9 3 One defense attorney has noted that the jury instruc-
tions meant to cure these problems are not only confusing for ju-
rors, but are meaningless to the lawyers who are supposedly
following them. 194 This view is shared by numerous legal schol-
ars.' 95 The potential impact of the press on jury deliberation pales
in the face of forces such as racism and misunderstanding. Social
science has much to tell us about these and other powerful forces
which may operate in the jury room.
CONCLUSION
The answer to the problem of selecting impartial juries is not pro-
vided by social science any more than it has been provided by ex-
isting judicial remedies. Rather, the answer lies in the public and
the court understanding that jurors have an active and meaningful
role to play in the trial process. Thus, we have come full circle.
When juries were first used, English village and town life was such
that everyone was likely to know what was going on. A crime of
sufficient gravity to warrant a jury was likely to be the talk of the
town. In order to sit on a twelfth century jury, one had to be knowl-
edgeable about the parties involved and the facts of the case. A
stranger was ineligible.
193. See generally Marcotte, The Verdict Is... , A.B.A.J.,June 1990, 32, 32 (reporting results
of ABA Litigation Section's study on jury comprehension authored by psychologist Elizabeth
Loftus). The report claimed that the "typical juror in complex federal cases... is bored and
confused. What's more, he misunderstands key legal concepts and struggles to reach a just
decision. And, the juror's task is made more difficult by the way lawyers and judges present
evidence and explain legal concepts." Id.
194. Panel One, supra note 97, at 556 (statement ofJamie S. Gorelick).
195. See Elwork, Sales & Alfini,Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or In Light of It?, 1
LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 163, 178 (1975). These researchers argue that:
If ajury is to successfully apply the law to a case, thejudge's instructions must be
written in language that is understandable to the average juror and they must be
delivered at times when they can be most effective. There is little doubt that present
procedures do not meet these criteria. Unless the situation is corrected, juries will
continue to reach decisions arbitrarily, and countless litigants will be denied their
constitutional right to a fair trial.
Id.; see also Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of
Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1359 (1979) (stating that studies underscore fact thatjury instructions are not written for intended audience). The inability ofjurors to understand
the charge has obvious implications concerning the soundness of the jury system. Id. lfju-
rors do not fully comprehend the laws that they are required to apply, it is possible that they
reach verdicts "either without regard to the law or by using improper law." Id.; accord For-
ston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 606 (finding that
condition of pervasive confusion exists among jurors in present jury system largely due to
poor communication). Forston explains that jurors often "improperly find the facts because
the concept of legal evidence is seldom adequately communicated to them." Id. Further-
more, they improperly apply the law because they are unable to understand the jury instruc-
tions and they often fail to consider rationally legal arguments because of their difficulty in
comprehending legal jargon. Id.
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Today the world is dramatically different. Villages and towns
have given way to cities and sprawling metropolises. Yet through
the vast expansion of the media and the proliferation of communica-
tions technologies, we once again frequently know what is going on
in our communities. In fact, we almost certainly know more about
notorious cases than did our twelfth century predecessors.
To think that jurors wholly unacquainted with the facts of a noto-
rious case can be impaneled today is to dream. Anyone meeting
that standard of ignorance should be suspect. The search for such a
jury is a chimera. It is also unnecessary. Knowledgeable jurors to-
day, like 800 years ago, can form an impartial jury. In fact, the very
diversity of views and experiences that they possess is the best guar-
antee of an impartial jury.
Faced with escalating media coverage of the people and events
which subsequently become embroiled in trials, and practical as well
as constitutional hurdles to stymieing that interest, courts are bet-
ting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, not to mention
their liberty and in some cases their lives, on ineffective judicial rem-
edies for identifying and remedying jury bias. These measures,
however, especially voir dire, misfocus the court's attention on the
exposure to press reports, rather than on the existence and degree
of any bias or prejudice that may have been engendered by such
exposure. As a result, some courts mistake "unaware" for "impar-
tial," and so search at great length for jurors who know nothing
about the case.
In the trial of District of Columbia Mayor Marion Barry, the court
distributed twenty-two pages of written questions to potential ju-
rors. These questions sought information on what television and
radio programs the potential jurors watched, what newspapers and
magazines they read, their political activities, the regularity of their
church or synagogue attendance, their views on the legalizations of
drugs and law enforcement techniques, their possible experience
with prejudice, and their "religious and philosophical beliefs."' 196 A
jury chosen according to these tests may raise serious questions
about the meaning of impartiality.
It is all too easy for the search for "unaware" jurors to divert a
court's attention from its constitutional obligation to seat an "im-
partial" jury. Moreover, such a quest excludes qualified citizens
from the jury, thereby denying the defendant's right to a representa-
tive, competent jury and denying media-literate citizens the oppor-
196. United States v. Barry, Criminal Case No. 90-0068 (D.D.C. 1990) (ProspectiveJuror
Questionnaire).
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tunity to study in a "free school.., in which each juror learns his
rights ... and is given practical lessons in the law .... ,,197
Courts need neither ignore the impact of media coverage on the
selection of an impartial jury nor become hopelessly enmeshed in
examining the amount and type of media coverage through ex-
tended and far-reaching voir dire. The language of the sixth
amendment, the dictates of the Supreme Court, and the realities of
modern society require that courts impanel juries which are impar-
tial, but not without knowledge and opinions.
Mark Twain's words of outrage that informed citizens were being
excluded from juries, penned more than a century ago, continue to
argue forcefully against the judicial practice of excluding the in-
formed from juries:
In this age, when a gentleman of high social standing, intelli-
gence, and probity swears that testimony given under solemn oath
will outweigh, with him, street talk and newspaper reports based
upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear
to their own ignorance and stupidity, and justice would be far
safer in his hands than in theirs. Why could not the jury law be so
altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with
fools and miscreants?198
197. A. DE TOCOUEVILLE, supra note 157, at 249.
198. M. TwAIN, supra note 10, at 307.
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